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Frye and Daubert: Does Pennsylvania Need a
Different Evidentiary Standard for Scientific
Evidence?
INTRODUCTION
As technology and science progress, the importance of expert
testimony in the courtroom increases in both civil' and criminal
litigation.2 The reliability and persuasiveness of many types of
expert testimony have drawn much scrutiny and criticism. 3 In
response to divergence in the circuits4 and the growing controversy
1. This is especially true in toxic and environmental tort litigation. See, e.g. McKenzie
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 674 A.2d 1167 (Pa- Commw. Ct. 1996), Blum v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), Commonwealth v. Al Hamilton
Contracting Co., 665 A.2d 849 (Pa- Commw. Ct. 1995). Scientific evidence is often necessary
for plaintiffs to not only win their cases, but to avoid summary judgment. See Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 E2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 509 U.S. 904 (1993).
This heightened reliance on scientific evidence occurs due to the indeterminacy of plaintiffs,
long periods between exposure to substances and possible detrimental effects and other
factors that raise serious issues of causation. Daubert, 951 F.2d 1128. The many hurdles with
which these plaintiffs are confronted make scientific evidence a necessity. Id.
2. The usage of expert testimony in criminal proceedings may be vital to a
prosecution that must base its entire case on circumstantial evidence. See Commonwealth v.
Crews, 640 A.2d 395 (Pa- 1994). The use of ballistics, forensics or other testing may be the
only way a jury may be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt in a particular case. Crews,
640 A.2d 395.
3. This criticism occurred in both "academia" (see, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALuIEo's
REVENGa: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991)) and the courts (see, e.g., Daubert, 951 F.2d
1128).
4. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993). "We granted
certiorari in light of the sharp divisions among the courts regarding the proper standard for
the admission of expert testimony." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584. Compare, e.g. Daubert, 951
F2d 1128 (general acceptance used) with DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d
941 (3d Cir. 1991) (general acceptance rejected after enactment of Federal Rules of
Evidence). In Daubert, the Ninth Circuit used the traditional Frye "General Acceptance Test"
for determining the admissibility of expert scientific evidence. Daubert, 951 F.2d 1128. (For
an explanation of the Frye test, see infra note 14). All of the other circuits, except the Third
and Second, followed the same test that the Ninth Circuit used. The Third Circuit expressly
rejected the General Acceptance test. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.
1984); DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 941. The Second Circuit did not expressly reject the General
Acceptance Test, but expressed doubts as to its continued validity in light of the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
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of 'junk science'5 in the courtroom, the Supreme Court of the
United States addressed the admissibility requirements for expert
scientific evidence in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
6
The Court's examination resulted in a "new" approach for
determining the admissibility of expert scientific testimony in
federal courts.7 Many states8 have adopted the Supreme Court's
approach in Daubert, but Pennsylvania has rejected the Daubert
standard.9 In failing to adopt Daubert, Pennsylvania continues to
use the traditional Frye "general acceptance" test ("Frye test") to
determine the admissibility of expert scientific testimony.'0
At first glance, the general acceptance standard for the
admissibility of scientific evidence seems well suited for preventing
"bad" scientific evidence from reaching the courtroom, but, upon
thorough examination, it is inadequate. Examination of the General
Acceptance Test, the more liberal Daubert approach, and policy
considerations leads to the conclusion that a general acceptance
standard is too rigid and must be replaced. If either test is properly
implemented, invalid evidence is excluded." However, a problem
arises when legitimate evidence, based upon a valid foundation, has
not yet reached a level of general acceptance in the scientific
community. This evidence can only be used at trial if a Daubert
standard is employed or, as is often the case in Frye jurisdictions,
if the trial court 'cheats' on the Frye test and inconsistently applies
the general acceptance standard.
5. The term "junk science" has been in use for many years, but gained widespread
usage (especially in the discussion of expert testimony and talks on tort reform) primarily
through the book Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom. In fact, this book was
cited by the Ninth Circuit in its first Daubert opinion. Daubert, 951 F2d at 1131. The term
connotes scientific procedures that are not based upon what is considered to be valid
scientific procedure. Id. The term is generally directed towards scientific experts that
produce studies especially for use when testifying. Id.
6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-95. The Court rejected the use of the traditional General
Acceptance Test as contradictory to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
8. In addition to mandatory adherence of Daubert in the federal system, at least
twenty-three states have explicitly followed Daubert and additional states have used similar
approaches.
9. Crews, 640 A.2d at 395. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to adopt a
Daubert-type analysis. Id.
10. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly adopted the Frye test for the first
time in Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa- 1977). A version of the General
Acceptance Test in Pennsylvania can be found in Pennsylvania cases from the 1950's. See
Commonwealth ex rel. Riccio v. Dilworth, 115 A-2d 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (exclusion of
polygraph evidence in a robbery case).




The Traditional General Acceptance Test
- The traditional rule covering the admissibility of expert scientific
evidence was first articulated in an appeal from a criminal
conviction in Frye v. United States.2 The United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed the admissibility of
blood-pressure deception measurements as a means of proving the
innocence of the defendant. 13 In an extremely brief opinion,14 the
court held that the blood pressure evidence was inadmissible
because the results were not generally accepted within the relevant
scientific field. 15 The Frye court summed up the rule as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.
16
This became known as the Frye "general acceptance" test and was
the dominant standard for admission of expert scientific evidence
in both the federal and state court systems for over half a century.
12. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye was convicted of second degree murder and
appealed the decision on the sole basis that the exclusion of proffered expert evidence was
reversible error. Id. at 1013.
13. Frye, 293 F. at 1013. This test was an early version of a lie detector. Daubert, 509
U.S. at 585. The test involved the use of blood pressure measurements to determine guilt and
was based on the interpretation of the test giver. Frye, 293 F at 1013. The interpretations of
various test administrators could differ and the physiological measurements could differ
depending on the test taker. Id. Therefore, the results of the test were clearly opinion, not
factual. Id. As such, the result of the test was scientifically uncertain. Id. These reasons still
preclude lie detector evidence under a Daubert analysis. See United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d
663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Lech, 895 F Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United
States v. Posado, 57 F.3d. 428, 435 (5th Cir. 1995).
14. The Frye opinion takes up less than two pages of the reporter, and the actual
portion considering the admissibility of expert scientific evidence consists of only two
paragraphs. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
15. Id. at 1014. The court stated that these fields were human psychology and
physiology. Id.
16. Id. In Daubert, the court quoted this passage and referred to it as "famous or
perhaps infamous." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-86.
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Under Frye's General Acceptance Test, a court faced with a
proffer of "novel" scientific evidence had to consider other
evidence to determine whether the expert evidence was "generally
accepted" in its relevant field.17 This process of determining the
acceptance of evidence required consideration of the following: "(1)
[T]he status, in the appropriate scientific community, of the
scientific principle underlying the proffered novel evidence; (2) the
technique applying the scientific principle; and (3) the application
of the technique on the particular occasion or occasions relevant to
the proffered testimony." 8 Thus, the general acceptance standard
excluded scientific evidence that was new or innovative even when
its foundational basis consisted of "valid" scientific testing and
principles. Expert scientific testimony could not be admitted until
the basis of the testimony moved from the forefront of the field to
the mainstream. Therefore, the General Acceptance Test precluded
all innovative testimony despite its relevance or reliability.
The Federal Rules of Evidence
Before 1975, evidentiary rules were solely a product of judicial
creation. In 1975, Congress ratified the Federal Rules of Evidence
("Fed. R. Evid.") which effected a dramatic change in the law of
evidence. Congress enacted these rules for use in all federal
courts. 9 The Supreme Court prescribed the rules of evidence. Some
rules were enacted as prescribed; others were amended by
Congressional advisory committees prior to ratification.
20
In the Daubert decision, the Supreme Court listed and discussed
the following rules that are central to evaluating expert scientific
testimony: Fed. R. Evid. 104, 401-03, 702-03, and 706.21 Rule 104
establishes the authority of a trial judge to determine the
17. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (1984). This other evidence consisted
of expert testimony regarding what is the generally accepted practice in a field. Douming,
753 F2d at 1234. This appears to be a circular approach in that a court needs to use expert
testimony to determine the validity of expert testimony.
18. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234. This is how the Third Circuit summarized the
procedure of a Frye hearing that determines whether expert scientific evidence satisfies
general acceptance requirements. Id. After examining this procedure, the Third Circuit
believed the Frye test did not conform to the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Id.
19. FED. R. EVID. 101.
20. Three legislative advisory committees participated in the enactment and
modification of the proposed rules of evidence. The House of Representatives and Senate
each had a committee. In addition, there was a joint committee composed of members from
both houses of Congress.
21. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-95.
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admissibility of evidence.22 This rule gives the trial judge extensive
power to exclude evidence 23 and is the source of the judge's
authority as "gatekeeper" of the evidence. Rule 401 articulates a
liberal definition of "relevant evidence."24 This broad definition
states that evidence is relevant if it possesses any tendency making
the existence of any fact of consequence probable or improbable. 25
Rule 402 establishes the admissibility of relevant evidence.26 Rule
403 grants a trial judge the discretion to exclude relevant
evidence. 27 The exclusion of relevant evidence can occur if the
judge determines that it will unfairly prejudice, mislead or confuse
the jury.28 In addition, the judge can exclude evidence if, in his
discretion, he determines that it will waste time or cause undue
delay.29 Rule 702 governs expert witnesses.3° Rule 702 states that
experts with scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
may testify as witnesses if such testimony assists the jury's
understanding of evidence or determination of a fact.3' Rule 703
changes the common law and allows for the admission of hearsay
evidence when experts are testifying.32 Experts can base an opinion
22. FED. R. Evm. 104(a). "PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS: (a) Questions of Admissibility
Generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court,
subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges." Id.
23. Id.
24. FED. R Evm. 401. "DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE: Relevant evidence
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence." Id.
25. Id.
26. FED. R Evm. 402. "RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE;
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE: All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Id.
27. FED. R. Evm. 403. "EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME: Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. FED. R. Evm. 702. "TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS: If scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
31. Id.
32. FED. R. EviD. 703. "BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS: The facts or
data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
1998
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on hearsay if the hearsay is a type of fact or data that is reasonably
relied upon by the witness' field of expertise. 33 The final rule that
the Supreme Court discussed in Daubert was Rule 706, which
allows a court to appoint its own expert witness.34
Shortly after Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
split in authority developed. The comments and legislative history
of Rule 701 did not mention the Frye general acceptance rule.
Congress' failure to mention Frye created uncertainty about the
relationship between Rule 701 and the general acceptance rule. A
majority of the circuits -5  viewed Congress' silence as an
endorsement of the continued validity of the General Acceptance
Test.36 The minority position held that the Federal Rules of
Evidence were clearly at odds with Frye.3 7 Under the minority
view, the Frye rule could not remain determinative and required
replacement.
In 1985, the Third Circuit rejected Frye with its decision in
United States v. Downing. s  In Downing, the Third Circuit
reviewed a criminal prosecution involving mail fraud.3 Downing
appealed his conviction in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.40
The district court had excluded the testimony of an expert witness
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If ofa type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." Id.
33. Id. "Hearsay" is defined as a "statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." FED. R. EvD. 801(c).
34. FED. R. Evm. 706.
35. Prior to Daubert, the Third Circuit was the only circuit to expressly reject Frye.
United State v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit also
expressed doubt about the validity of Frye, but did not expressly reject it. See United States
v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that the Fed. R. Evid. supersede Frye), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). Therefore, the count in the circuits was 11:2 in favor of
retaining Frye even though the language of the Fed. R. Evid. did not seem to endorse such
an approach.
36. In fact, some circuits found that Frye actually conformed with the Fed. R. Evid.
and explicitly retained the General Acceptance Test. See Barrel of Fun Inc. v. State Farm Fire
and Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984).
37. Downing, 753 E2d 1224. The Supreme Court of the United States adopted this
minority position. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. The Court noted that it was specifically basing
Daubert in part on Downing (which was the genesis of the Third Circuit's minority
approach). See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 n.12.
38. 753 F2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
39. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1227. Downing was convicted of mail fraud (18 U.S.C.
§§ 1341-42), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §1343), and interstate transport of stolen property (18
U.S.C. § 2314). Id.
40. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1224.
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for the defense.41  The expert testimony would have been
introduced to show the unreliability of eyewitness recollections
based on psychological studies.42 The district court excluded the
expert evidence based upon the General Acceptance Test of Frye.4,
Downing argued that the Frye test conflicted with the Federal
Rules of Evidence and thus the district court erroneously excluded
the expert testimony.44 The Third Circuit court agreed and held the
General Acceptance Test invalid.
45
After invalidating the Frye test, the Third Circuit created a new
test based upon the language of Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402
and 701.46 The Third Circuit proposed this test to satisfy the more
flexible standards of the Fed. R. Evid. The Downing test consisted
of a preliminary inquiry by the court on the relevancy and
reliability of novel scientific evidence.47 The Third Circuit stressed
that the quality of the evidence was more important than the
quantity of people who accepted its use.48 The Third Circuit
summed up its position by stating:
In our view, Rule 702 requires that a district court ruling upon
the admission of (novel) scientific evidence, . . . conduct a
preliminary inquiry focusing on (1) the soundness and
reliability of the process or technique used in generating the
evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting the evidence would
overwhelm, confuse, or mislead, the jury, and (3) the proffered
connection between the scientific research or test result to be
presented, and particular disputed factual issue in the case.
49
Thus, the Third Circuit abandoned a general acceptance approach
41. Id. at 1226.
42. Id. at 1227. The defense attempted to'introduce this expert evidence because the
prosecution's case consisted solely of eye witness accounts. Id.
43. Id. at 1228.
44. Id. at 1226.
45. Douming, 753 F2d at 1234.
46. Id. at 1237-39. For the text of these rules, see supra notes 24 and 26.
47. Id. at 1237. The Third Circuit noted that this preliminary inquiry was not necessary
if the proffered evidence had a foundational basis that was capable of being accepted via
judicial notice. Id. at 1241. The Supreme Court also noted that firmly established scientific
theories are "properly subject to judicial notice" under Fed. R. Evid. 201. Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 593 n.11. The court labeled these theories "scientific laws" and listed thermodynamics as
an example. Id.
48. Id. at 1237-38. The Third Circuit referred to the Frye test as "nose counting." Id.
49. Id. at 1237. The court describes this procedure as "an incorporation of the
relevancy and prejudice analyses implicated in iule 702's helpfulness standard." Id. at 1237
n.15. This means that the court must also determine that the offered testimony will be
helpful to the fact finders in maling their determination. Id.
1998
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in admitting scientific evidence and replaced it with a flexible
balancing analysis. A district court may consider general
acceptance in deciding whether to admit scientific evidence, but it
is no longer dispositive.
THE DAUBERT CASE
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, two infants 5° born
with birth defects and their parents sued Merrell Dow in California
state court alleging that the mothers' ingestion of the drug
Bendectin 51 during pregnancy caused the children's birth defects.
Merrell Dow removed the suits to the Southern District of
California on diversity grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1332
and 1441.52
After the completion of discovery, Merrell Dow moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact concerning causation.3 Merrell Dow
asserted that the evidence did not prove that Bendectin was more
probably than not the proximate cause of the infant-plaintiffs' birth
defects.54 The district court granted Merrell Dow's motion based on
epidemiological studies that showed no significant increase in birth
defects arising from in utero exposure to Bendectin.5 The district
court did not consider the plaintiffs' evidence, however, because it
determined that the evidence failed to satisfy the General
50. Daubert, 43 F.3d 1311, 1313. The plaintiffs were Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller.
Id. at 1311. Both plaintiffs were born with limb reduction birth defects. Id. This deformity is
fairly rare. Id. at 1313. It occurs in less than one birth out of every thousand. Id.
51. Id. at 1313. Bendectin was the brand name for a prescription anti-nausea drug
manufactured by Merrell Dow. Id.
52. The requirements for diversity in the federal system are set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1998). Diversity is present when the amount in controversy in a civil action exceeds
$75,000. (The amount in controversy was increased as of January 1, 1997. The controversy
amount at the time of Daubert was $50,000 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1989), exclusive of costs
and interest.) In addition, the plaintiffs and defendants must be citizens of different states.
When both requirements are met, a federal district court may assert original jurisdiction 28
U.S.C. §1332 (1998). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1441, the defendant may remove a suit filed in a state
court to the appropriate federal district court if the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1332 are
satisfied 18 U.S.C. §1441. In Daubert, both requirements for diversity jurisdiction were found
to exist by the district court because the alleged damages were in excess of $50,000, Merreil
Dow was found to be a Delaware resident, and Daubert a California resident. Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F Supp. 570 (S.D. Ca 1989).
53. Daubert, 727 F Supp. at 571.
54. Id. at 571-72.
55. Epidemiological studies are statistical analyses that compare the incidence of a
disease in a control group that has not been exposed to the concerned agent with the
incidence of disease in an exposed group, to determine exposure causation.
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Acceptance Test." The excluded evidence consisted of in vitro
studies,57 chemical analyses comparing a component chemical of
Bendectin to known teratogens," and animal studies.59 The
plaintiffs' evidence did not satisfy the general acceptance
requirement because it was not the type of evidence that scientists
generally use to establish a causal link between a substance and
birth defects.6° The plaintiffs also attempted to introduce an
unpublished reanalysis of epidemiological studies.6' The district
court stated that the study was unreliable and therefore failed to
adequately support the claim that Bendectin significantly increased
the incidence of birth defects.
62
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the Ninth Circuit. 3 The plaintiffs argued that the
district court ruled erroneously because the scientific evidence that
they proffered created a genuine issue of causation for the jury to
decide. Affirming the district court, the circuit court held that the
plaintiffs' scientific evidence did not satisfy the Ninth Circuit's
general acceptance requirement.64 The circuit court stated that
epidemiological studies were the generally accepted means of
establishing a causal link between a substance and human birth
defects." The circuit court further concluded that the plaintiffs'
epidemiological study did not satisfy the generally accepted
procedure of publishing results and subjecting them to peer
review." The court based its ruling on the scientists' unwillingness
to subject their epidemiological studies to peer review and
scientific scrutiny coupled with their willingness to produce the
study for litigation.
67
The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the Ninth
56. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
57. In vitro studies are commonly referred to as "test tube" studies. They study the
effect of chemical agents on cell or tissue cultures instead of complete organisms.
58. A "teratogen" is an agent that causes developmental defects in fetal tissue.
MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1216 (10Tm ED. 1994).
59. Animal studies attempt to show an agent's effect on humans by extrapolating the
effect on species that possess similar physiological systems.
60. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
61. Id. at 575-76.
62. Id.
63. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 951 F2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
64. Daubert, 951 F2d at 1129-30. The Ninth Circuit did note that this was not the
standard in the Third Circuit, citing DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941
(3d Cir. 1990). Daubert, 951 F2d at 1130 n.2.





Circuit's affirmation of the district court's grant of summary
judgment. The petition for certiorari presented two questions:
First, whether the rule of Frye v. United States remains good
law after the enactment of the Federal Rules of evidence; and
second, if Frye remains valid, whether it requires expert
scientific testimony to have been subject to a peer review
process in order to be admissible.r
The Supreme Court held that Frye was no longer good law and,
thus, the second question was rendered moot.69 The Court vacated
the judgment regarding the inadmissibility of the proffered
scientific evidence.70 Reversal was required as a matter of law since
the Court ruled that Frye no longer controlled. In addition to
overruling Frye, the Daubert Court's decision compels federal
judges to be the "gatekeepers" of scientific evidence and arbiters of
what constitutes "good" science.
71
The Federal Rules of Evidence, which have controlled
admissibility of scientific evidence since their enactment in 1975,
provide for a "liberal thrust"72 which conflicts with the "rigid"
common law General Acceptance Test of Frye.73 The Court
specifically stated that a general acceptance standard is
inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence and, therefore,
must be overruled. 74
The second major part of Daubert establishes the "gatekeeping"
role of district courts in determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence.75 "[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
68. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598 (citations omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The facts of Daubert dealt with the admission of expert scientific testimony,
but the Court noted that its opinion extended to technical and other expert testimony
because of the language and scope of Fed. R. Evid. 701. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
72. Id. at 588.
73. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
74. Id. at 589.
75. Id. at 593-94. This "gatekeeping" role of federal judges derives from Fed. R. Evid.
104(a) (see supra. note 22). It represents the broad discretion federal judges possess when
making preliminary determinations involving evidence. Id. Judges are authorized to make any
preliminary determinations they feel are necessary when determining the qualification of a
witness or the admissibility of evidence. Id. Federal judges possess no discretionary
limitations in this "gatekeeping" role except those associated with privileges, such as
attorney-client privilege (which protects the client by preventing an attorney from being
compelled, under court order, to divulge information obtained in the course of
representation) and relevancy as stated in Fed. R. Evid. 104(b). FED. R Evin. 104(a).
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relevant, but reliable."76 This "gatekeeping" role commands the
judge to evaluate the relevancy and reliability of evidence using a
preponderance standard.77  It is based upon and fulfills the
mandates of Rule 104.78 The Supreme Court summed up the trial
court's gatekeeping as follows:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the
trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule
104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue. We are confident that federal
judges possess the capacity to undertake this review.79
The Court also noted that trial courts may consider hearsay
testimony8° and procure the assistance of an expert of their own
choosing8l in performing the "gatekeeping" role. Finally, the Court
noted scientific evidence that is both relevant and reliable may still
be excluded pursuant to Rule 403.82
In order for trial courts to effectuate their "gatekeeping" role, the
76. Id. at 589.
77. Id. at 593 n.10. The Court directed attention to Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987). This case establishes the standard of proof that a court must use in
establishing the admission of evidence under the Fed. R. Evid. Id. The preponderance
standard is a determination that a fact is more likely than not true. Numerically this would
be expressed as a likelihood in excess of fifty percent.
78. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. See supra note 22; FED. R EvrD. 104.
79. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
80. Id. at 595. The court based this assertion on Fed. R. Evid. 703. Id.
81. Id. This is based upon Fed. R. Evid. 706. Id. The court may obtain an expert to
clarify scientific testimony and evidence presented by the parties' experts. Id. This expert
works for the court and informs and educates the judge regarding principles necessary for
making his or her determinations. Id. Fed. R. Evid. 706 represents Congress' realization that
judges are experts in the law and not in scientific theories. Id. As such, a judge may need
assistance in reaching the proper determination. Id.
82. Id. (For the text of Fed. R. Evid. 403, see supra note 27). The evidence may be
excluded if it satisfies the reliability and relevance requirements if the judge, in his
"gatekeeping" role, determines that the evidence will substantially confuse or mislead the
jury. Id. Thus, evidence that is probative, but not legitimately comprehensible to the jury or
is not subject to realistic evaluation by the jury can be excluded by the trial judge. Id. In
addition, the trial judge can exclude relevant evidence if the evidence is unfairly prejudicial
(in that it may affect the jury's emotions more than it aids the jury in its analytical
determinations of the facts); cumulative (the parties case has already been proved and this
evidence is only "piling" it on); or causes undue delay in the trial. FED. R. EVID. 403.
Duquesne Law Review
Supreme Court listed a series of factors the trial courts may
consider in their assessment of the reliability and relevancy of
scientific evidence.83 This list consisted of: whether the scientific
knowledge can and has been tested;8 whether the theory and
methodology have been subjected to peer review, including
publication;85 the known or potential rate of error for the expert's
techniques;86  the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation;87  and the possible
incorporation of "general acceptance" into the overall inquiry.88 The
Court stated that the list was not definitive, but merely
representative of the general types of inquiries appropriate for
satisfaction of the Federal Rules of Evidence's flexible standard of
admissibility.89
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded Daubert for the
determination of whether the proffered scientific evidence would
be admissible under the more liberal standard of the Fed. R. Evid.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit articulated a two-prong test, based on
Daubert, for analysis of scientific evidence. 90 The first prong
questions whether the proffered testimony consists of "scientific
knowledge," that is, whether the expert's findings are "derived by
the scientific method" and amount to "good science."91 The second
prong, labeled by the Ninth Circuit as the "fit" requirement for
admissibility,92 questions whether the testimony is "relevant to the
task at hand."93 If the evidence produces an affirmative answer for
both prongs, the evidence is considered relevant and reliable and
thus admissible.9 4
The Ninth Circuit stated that the factors listed by the Supreme
83. Dauben, 509 U.S. at 593.
84. Id.
85. Id. Publication, although important, is not the only element of peer review. Id. The
Court stated that publication is not a sine qua non of admissibility and may not even
guarantee reliability. Id.
86. Id. at 594.
87. Id.
88. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. The Court noted that general acceptance is not required,
but may be permitted. Id.
89. Id. at 593.
90. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 43 F3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995).
91. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1315 (quoting the Supreme Court's language in Daubert). The
Court defined "scientific" as a term "impl[ying] a grounding in the methods and procedures
of science." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. "Similarly, the word 'knowledge' connotes more than a
subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Id.





Court were only illustrative95 and, therefore, the court was not
required to weigh all of these possible factors. 96 The Ninth Circuit
concentrated its analysis on the fact that the scientific results were
unpublished and were merely prepared for litigation purposes.
97
Although that did not automatically invalidate the scientific
evidence, it subjected the evidence to closer scrutiny.98 The circuit
court noted that the results of the first prong of its Daubert
analysis did not favor the plaintiffs, but if its analysis were limited
only to this test, it would be inclined to remand to allow the
plaintiffs to introduce more evidence. 99 However, the circuit
concluded that it could not remand the case based upon the
second prong of its Daubert analysis.1°° The circuit court noted that
establishing causation requires a plaintiff to prove that a substance
did increase the likelihood of injury - not that it could merely
have increased the likelihood of injury.1°1 Specifically, the plaintiff
must show that the substance, more likely than not, caused the
injury or increased the risk of injury to a level greater than fifty
percent.1° Because the plaintiff's evidence could not establish this
level of causation, it failed the "fit" requirement. Consequently, the
circuit affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiffs' scientific evidence
and the resulting summary judgment for the defendants.13
AFTER DAUBERT
Daubert extrapolated Third Circuit precedent established almost
a decade earlier in Downing and employed an even broader
approach. °4  The Third Circuit revisited the issue of the
95. Id. at 1317-18. In fact, the Ninth Circuit found it was impossible to utilize all of
the factors in the Daubert case. Id. at 1317 n.4.
96. Id.
97. Daubert, 43 F3d at 1317-20.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1321.
101. Id. at 1320-21.
102. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320-21. Causation is an issue of substantive law. In diversity
cases, the law of the forum state is controlling. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the state." Erie Railroad, 304 U.S. at 78. Thus,
the causation standard is the substantive law of California. Id.
103. The plaintiffs appealed the decision, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 116 S. Ct. 189 (1995).
104. The Daubert approach was broader, in that the Supreme Court examined more of
the Federal Rules of Evidence than the Third Circuit had and considered more factors in
determining what constitutes "relevant" and "reliable" scientific evidence.
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admissibility of scientific evidence in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig.10 5 Paoli illustrates the interaction of the Third Circuit's
Downing test with the mandated "gatekeeping" role for federal
judges set forth in Daubert.
In Paoli, a mass toxic tort case,1°6 the plaintiffs sued for damages
resulting from their exposure to PCBs.'0 7 The plaintiffs claimed that
their damages consisted of present personal injury, monitoring for
future injuries necessitated by their increased risk of disease and
the diminution of the market value of their property.1°8 The district
court excluded the plaintiffs' expert scientific evidence and granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
In reviewing the district court's holding, the Third Circuit
considered both the Daubert and Downing standards. The court
held that a trial court must conduct extensive review of scientific
evidence and hold in limine hearings at which all parties may offer
proof.1°9 In addition to in limine hearings, the Third Circuit stated
that a district court must allow extensive discovery of expert
105. 35 F3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nora., General Elec. Co. v. Ingram, 513
U.S. 1190 (1995). This case is actually the Third Circuit's second review of the trial court's
exclusion of evidence and grant of summary judgment. For this reason, the case is referred
to as Paoli H for convenience. The first time that the Third Circuit reviewed the case, it did
so based solely on the standards set forth in Downing.
106. In 1986, thirty-eight plaintiffs originally filed suit against nine different defendants
consisting of a variety of governmental entities or major corporations. See In re Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litig., 706 F Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa 1988). Some suits were fied in Pennsylvania
courts while others were filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Paoli, 706 F Supp. at
358. The district court's jurisdiction was originally based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which allows
jurisdiction in suits arising under a federal question (in this case the federal question was the
recovery of damages and response costs under CERCLA). Id. The state claims were
consolidated in the district court under pendant jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
Id. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims except the CERCLA claims.
Id. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded based upon procedural grounds and ordered
the trial court to develop a better factual record. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916
F2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Paoli F). In response to the order, the district court held five days
of in limine hearings and again excluded the plaintiffs' evidence. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 811 F Supp. 1071 (E.D. Pa. 1992). The district court then granted summary
judgment in a 330 page opinion. Paoli, 811 F. Supp. at 1071. This resulted in the Third Circuit
reviewing the case a second time and interpreting the evidence based upon the 'new'
"gatekeeping" mandate set forth by Daubert. In re Paoli R.R. Yard Litig., 35 F3d 717 (3d. Cir.
1994).
107. "PCB" is an abbreviation for poly-chlorinated biphenyl. These materials were
manufactured and sold as insulators. The largest PCB manufacturer was Monsanto
Corporation who marketed them under the trade name Aroclor. PCBs were determined to be
highly toxic and a possible human carcinogen in many various forms including furans and
dioxins which are two substances into which PCBs may convert.
108. Paoli II, 35 F3d at 738-39. The plaintiffs originally included CERCLA claims, but
voluntarily dismissed these after Paoli I. Id.
109. Id. at 738-39.
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testimony including depositions of the opposing party's experts. 110
Following the liberal Daubert approach, the Third Circuit
instructed that the following factors should be considered in
evaluating the admissibility of expert evidence: the expert's
qualifications,"' the reliability of the proffered testimony, 12 and
how the evidence "fit" the case." 3 In addition, the Third Circuit
stressed that the reliability and relevance of the evidence should be
weighed against the possibility of confusing the jury."4 The Paoli
court referred to this as the "Rule 403/702 balancing test" and
emphasized that the mere difficulty or complexity of scientific
evidence is not in issue." 5 Unless all of these requirements are
satisfied, the court held, scientific evidence is not admissible under
the Daubert analysis of the Fed. R. Evid." 6 Thus, the Paoli III
Daubert analysis has replaced Downing as the Third Circuit's




At the present, evidentiary rules in Pennsylvania are derived
solely from court decisions, and as such, rules of evidence derive
from case precedent." 8 A review of Pennsylvania cases shows that
110. Id. at 739.
111. Id. at 741. The Third Circuit stressed that this requirement was to be liberally
interpreted. Id. It also stated that a court cannot determine that the lack of a certain degree
is solely the proper grounds for exclusion of evidence. Id.
112. Id. at 742. The Third Circuit stated that reliability is a flexible standard that a
court can determine by using numerous factors, but that it was making clear that a trial
court should use all of the factors listed in either Daubert or Downing. Id. The court then
listed these eight factors that it deemed important. Id. at 742 n.8. The court stated that any
other factors that are relevant must also be considered. Id. at 742.
113. Paoli H, 35 E3d at 742-43. The scientific evidence does not "fit" unless it will
assist the trier of fact. Id. "Fit" was originally put forth in Downing and is part of that
decision adopted in Daubert.
114. Id. at 746-47.
115. Id. at 746. The Third Circuit stated that only something particularly confusing will
lead to the exclusion of scientific evidence. Id. at 747.
116. Id. at 745. "[A]ny step that renders the analysis unreliable under the Daubert
factors renders the expert's testimony inadmissible." Id.
117. The litigation concerning the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island on March 28,
1979 illustrates a district court's implementation of the Paoli IL/Daubert analysis. See In re
TMI Litig. II, 910 FSupp 200 (M.D. Pa. 1996); In re TMI Litig. 11, 911 F. Supp. 775 (M.D. Pa
1996); In re TMI Litig. I1, 922 F Supp. 997 (M.D. Pa. 1996); In re TMI Litig. II, 922 F. Supp.
1038 (M.D. Pa. 1996); In re TMI Litig. 11, 927 F Supp 834 (M.D. Pa. 1996); In re TMI Litig. H,
166 F.R.D. (M.D. Pa. 1996); In re TMI Litig. 11, 1995 WL 848519 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
118. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Adopts First Rules of Evidence, May 14, 1998,
<http://www.courts.state.pa.us/pub/commleg/prrel508.htm>. The administrative office of the
1998
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the Commonwealth has not produced an authoritative opinion"19
changing or abandoning the General Acceptance Test in favor of a
Daubert-type approach.120
A Pennsylvania appellate court first addressed the admissibility
of scientific evidence after Daubert in Commonwealth v. Crews.'21
In Crews, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the
admissibility of DNA testing. 122 In determining that DNA evidence
was admissible, the court acknowledged that the standard for the
admission of scientific evidence remained general acceptance. The
supreme court noted the Supreme Court of the United States'
decision in Daubert, but chose not to adopt a similar standard or
test in Pennsylvania. 12 In rejecting the adoption of Daubert, the
Pennsylvania court stated that the Daubert decision was a narrow
holding. 24 The court believed Daubert did not establish a test to
determine the worthiness of scientific evidence, but merely
Pennsylvania courts issued a press release announcing that the Supreme Court adopted a set
of evidentiary rules for Pennsylvania on May 8, 1998. Id. The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence
are scheduled to come into effect on October 1, 1998. Id. These rules will govern and
practitioners will no longer have to search case law to determine evidentiary rules. Id.
119. The meaning of authoritative in this sense refers to opinions originating in a state
appellate court that would be binding on state trial courts. In Pennsylvania, authoritative
opinions could be authored by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth Court
acting in its capacity as an appellate court for cases in which the Commonwealth is a party,
and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
120. The Pennsylvania appellate cases that have dealt with the admissibility of
scientific evidence since Daubert are Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994);
Commonwealth v. Crawford, 682 A-2d 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); McKenzie v. Westinghouse
Elec. Co., 674 A.2d 1167 (Pa Commw. Ct. 1996); Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 685 A.2d 151
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Dalrymple v. Broum, 701 A.2d 164, 172 (Pa 1997) (Newman, J.,
concurring); Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
None of these cases chose to adopt a more liberal approach to scientific evidence. In fact,
the courts in these cases determined that the question of whether Pennsylvania should adopt
a more liberal standard than "general acceptance" was not before them and, therefore, the
question of whether to adopt an approach similar to Daubert was not considered.
121. 640 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994). In Crews, the Supreme Court reviewed an appeal of two
first degree murder convictions that had resulted in the imposition of the death sentence.
Crews, 640 A.2d at 395.
122. Crews, 640 A.2d at 399-403. "DNA" is the abbreviation for deoxyribonucleic acid.
DNA is double strand of base pairs that determines genetic characteristics based upon the
sequence of the pairs. The individuality of humans derives from the sequence of their DNA.
The theory behind DNA testing rests on the differences at certain sites on the DNA strand
and the probability that the DNA sequences located at a crime scene only match those of the
suspect, instead of a random individual from the general population. Id.
123. Id. at 400.
124. * Id. at 400 n.2. The court meant that the holding was narrow in that it was based
upon the Fed. R. Evid. and not Constitutional grounds. Thus, the case's precedent did not
invoke the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requiring implementation of
the Daubert holding by state courts.
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established the interpretative standard for the Federal Rules of
Evidence 25 Because the Federal Rules of Evidence were not
authoritative in Pennsylvania and, at the time Crews was decided,
the state had no evidentiary code based upon the rules, the court
refused to adopt an interpretive procedural rule lacking a
substantive nature. 26
The court reiterated that "general acceptance" remains the
standard for the admission of scientific evidence in Pennsylvania.
1 27
The court further stated that it was not willing to replace Frye at
the present.128 Although the court chose not to follow Daubert, it
did state that a trial court must consider the relevancy and
probative value of scientific evidence when determining its
admissibility.129 This statement indicates that although Pennsylvania
claims to retain general acceptance, the actual standard is not that
rigid. Additionally, the supreme court stated that the jury must
evaluate the weight and persuasiveness of evidence and these
factors must not operate as the judge's basis for excluding
scientific evidence.130
Until very recently, Crews was the only Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decision that addressed a Daubert approach for
evaluating expert evidence.' 3' In fact, in Crews, the supreme court
addressed the admissibility of expert scientific evidence more
thoroughly than almost any other Pennsylvania appellate case.'
32
Nevertheless, the court expressly refused to contemplate or
speculate on the Pennsylvania court's approach toward scientific
125. Id.
126. Id. See supra note 118.
127. Crews, 640 A.2d at 400. "When scientific advances produce new types of
evidence, admissibility of such evidence depends on the test first laid down in Frye." Id. The
court then quoted the passage from Frye located in the text of this paper accompanying
supra note 14.
128. Id at 400 r.2.
129. Id. at 402. The Court noted that it has looked at relevancy and probative value on
numerous occasions. See Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 834 (Pa. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 617 A.2d 696, 699 (Pa 1992); Commonwealth v. Foy, 612 A.2d
1349, 1351 (Pa 1992).
130. Crews, 640 A.2d at 402-03.
131. In addition to Crews, Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 172 (Pa. 1997) discussed
Daubert's more liberal approach to the admissibility of expert scientific evidence. Daubert
was cited in Justice Newman's concurrence in Dalrymple.
132. The only appellate cases that addressed the issue more thoroughly were
McKenzie v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 674 A.2d 1167 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) and Blum v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). Both cases involved toxic
torts and had nearly identical fact patterns to Daubert.
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evidence in the future.13  The lower appellate courts in
Pennsylvania have apparently recognized that adopting the Daubert
approach is exclusively the province of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.'-
. On June 16, 1998, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
affirming the decision of the superior court, explicitly rejected the
Daubert test in Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 1998 WL 313388 (Pa.
1998). The court stated that the stricter standard of Frye remains
the test for evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence in
Pennsylvania.'
ANALYSIS
To allow trial courts greater flexibility and discretion when
determining the admissibility of expert scientific evidence,
Pennsylvania must adopt the Daubert standard. Such a standard
enables valid scientific evidence to be admitted while still
excluding invalid scientific evidence. The fact that invalid evidence
is excluded by a Daubert "reliability/relevance" standard is
demonstrated by looking at analogous evidence evaluated under
both the Daubert and Frye standards.
Epidemiological studies that are not statistically validated are
inadmissible under both the Daubert standard'm and the general
acceptance standard. 37  Further, unpublished epidemiological
133. Crews, 640 A.2d at 400 n.2. The court stated, "Whether or not the rationale of
Daubert will supersede or modify the Frye test in Pennsylvania is left to another day." Id.
134. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 682 A.2d 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); McKenzie V.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 674 A.2d 1167 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); Commonwealth v. Blasioli,
685 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 705 A.2d 1314
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
135. Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 1998 WL 313388, *10 n.1 (Pa., June 16, 1998). The court
stated:
As a matter of federal jurisprudence, Frye was overruled in Daubert v. MerreU Dow,
509 U.S. 579 .. . (1993), on the ground that it had been superceded by the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Daubert establishes a two-prong test to determine admissibility of
scientific evidence: 1) will the testimony assist the trier of fact; and 2) will the
testimony be reliable or scientifically valid?... Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts are
not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and, for the present, this Court has
continued to employ the Frye standard for determining the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence. . . . [Slee also Pa. R. E[vid]. 702, Comment (adopted May 8, 1998;
effective October 1, 1998).
Id. (citations omitted).
136. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (on
remand); see also DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990)
(citing similar studies and was decided prior to the United States Supreme Court's mandate).
. 137. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. 1997). The
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studies prepared exclusively for litigation, even if based upon a
valid statistical theory, may be inadmissible under the reliability
analysis of Daubert.13s However, these same studies are
theoretically admissible under the General Acceptance Test despite
their unreliability if they satisfy generally accepted standards in the
field.139 Courts have successfully excluded unreliable evidence
under both "general acceptance" and the more liberal approach of
Daubert as demonstrated by their exclusion of animal studies that
are determinative of human teratogens,'
4°  polygraph tests,'4 '
"multiple chemical sensitivity,"42 and repressed memory revival.'4
Such exclusions demonstrate that the Daubert standard excludes
"junk science" and strongly suggests that the claims of unreliable
scientific evidence flooding the courts are unfounded.
Policy dictates that Pennsylvania must adopt a more liberal
standard for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Criticism of adopting a more liberal admissibility standard rests on
paternalistic beliefs that we must protect juries from their own
inability to evaluate the validity of scientific evidence.' 44 These
paternalistic beliefs essentially eviscerate the jury system by
undermining the supposed faith that our judicial system places in
juries. If jurors are not trusted to reach an accurate verdict based
on reliable and relevant evidence admitted under the Daubert
standard, how can the courts entrust jurors to determine the life
fact that trial courts often ignore the literal mandates of the General Acceptance Test are
demonstrated by the trial court's decision that was reversed in this case. The trial court
admitted the evidence in this case even though a careful analysis of it clearly demonstrated
that it did not satisfy the General Acceptance Test. In addition, courts that had properly
analyzed the same type of evidence under the more liberal Daubert standard also determined
that it was not admissible.
138. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 43 E3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). A
famous observation of British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli sums up the view that
statistical evidence may be unreliable, "There are three types of lies, white lies, damn lies
and statistics." quoted in THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK TwAi (Charles Neider, ed. 1959).
139. frye, 293 F at 1014. This result occurs because the reliability of evidence is not
the thrust of the Frye test Id.
140. Daubert, 43 F3d 1311.
141. United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1995).
142. Summers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Sys., 897 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Okla 1995). Multiple
chemical sensitivity is a condition whereby a person has been exposed to so many
environmental contaminants that his/her immune system is supposedly affected resulting in
hypersensitivity to most substances. Summers, 897 F Supp. at 536.
143. Doe v. Maskell, 679 A.2d 1087 (Md. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
144. Blum, 705 A.2d at 1316. The Frye test represents an attempt to measure the




and death of individuals in capital cases? 145 Further,
Anglo-American jurisprudence places such importance on juries
that their use is constitutionally guaranteed in both the federal
Constitution 146 and that of the Commonwealth.
47
"General acceptance" is often mistakenly equated with validity;
such an assumption is not true. Since courts often are not
well-versed in scientific theory, they delegate their decision-making
capacity to the general scientific community. If the scientific
community were quick to adopt all valid theories, this procedure
would be effective. However, scientists are often reluctant to
change their views and are not willing to embrace novel or new
theories, even those based on valid scientific principles and
procedures. This hesitance occurs because of the basic tenets
underlying scientific procedures and the belief that one can never
prove a theory, only disprove it.'48 Proper scientific procedure
involves experimentation designed to disprove a theory. Scientific
experimentation cannot prove a theory. 49 Due to the extensive
scrutiny that a theorem must pass, a theory that is valid (reliable in
the text of admitting evidence) may not be "generally accepted."
CONCLUSION
The supreme court stated in Crews, "Whether or not the
rationale of Daubert will supersede or modify the Frye test in
Pennsylvania is left to another day."' 5° That day has come and the
Supreme Court must adopt a more liberal admissibility standard
145. 234 P& CODE §§ 351-59. These rules govern the proper form that a jury verdict
must follow in capital cases when a jury trial has not been waived. Id.
146. See U.S. CONsr. amend. VI (guarantee of jury trial in criminal case); and U.S.
CONsT. amend. VII (guarantee of jury trial in civil cases).
147. PA. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
148. An explanation of this limitation on scientific theory can be found in Bertrand
Russell's Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948).
149. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. In Daubert, the Court appears to understand the
heightened level of proof that science requires and the concept that science is not able to
truly prove any hypotheses. Id. at 509
Of course, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific
testimony must be 'known' to a certainty;, arguably, there are no certainties in science.
Indeed, scientists do not assert that they know what is immutably 'true'-they are
committed to searching for new, temporary, theories to explain, as best they can,
phenomena. Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the universe.
Instead, it represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations
about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement.
Id. (citations omitted).
150. Crews, 640 A.2d at 400 n.2.
Vol. 36:597
Scientific Evidence
than that of Frye. The usage of the General Acceptance Test
produces two undesirable outcomes when valid evidence is
introduced. The General Acceptance Test either excludes valid
testimony, or causes a court to ignore the literal mandates of the
test to admit valid evidence. Both outcomes are unsatisfactory. The
exclusion of evidence may produce unjust results by preventing a
party from proving his/her case. This is an affront to justice.
However, the admission of valid evidence contrary to the literal
terms of the general acceptance rule is equally disturbing because
such disregard breeds inconsistency and uncertainty in the courts.
This inconsistency and uncertainty destroys people's faith in the
judicial system. The only way to prevent both undesirable
outcomes is by basing the admission of evidence on its reliability
and relevance, despite its general acceptance. If evidence is reliable
and relevant, it must be admitted. Only this allows the jury system
to work as intended.
Leonidas Pandeladis
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